Sixty is not generally
considered a number of symbolic distinction or festive significance. Even
so, on this sixtieth anniversary of the creation of the State of Israel,
various events have been scheduled around the world, by Jews and non-Jews
alike, to celebrate this birthday. Why is this so? It sometimes seems to
me that because Israel is the young state of an old nation, it is treated
as a child but also as someone elderly. In order to strengthen this
complicated personality, much attention is devoted to the celebration of
its birthdays, so that the honoree will feel still loved by others despite
all its problems.
Indeed, the special attention lavished upon Israel as it reaches the age
of 60 is quite significant. Ten years ago, on Israel’s fiftieth
anniversary in 1998, following the path-breaking Oslo Accords, there was a
general feeling that this longstanding conflict was at last becoming
resolved. The general feeling about the future was positive.
And yet, unfortunately, during the past 10 years there have been painful
setbacks. Such instances of regression carry a special sort of sadness.
Individuals and peoples are capable of enduring difficulties for a long
while if there is a sense that the future will be better, but when, in the
midst of a process of rehabilitation, there is a sudden backward
regression, despair can set in. This is the pain we have experienced over
the last 10 years, and continue to feel today.
During the 1948 War of Independence, the newborn Jewish State literally
fought for its life, and its destruction was a distinct possibility. In
the Six-Day War as well, the danger to Israel’s very existence was real,
and nevertheless, it seems to me, that there were no Israelis who then
said aloud the distressing words I sometimes hear today: “The State of
Israel could turn out to be just an episode in Jewish history.”
Why is it that political struggles more complex and difficult than the
Israel-Arab conflict— the problem of apartheid in South Africa, for
example, or the collapse of the former Soviet Union — all seem in the
end to have been resolved, whereas with us in the Middle East the conflict
claims more victims every day? What is it about this dispute that refuses
to be resolved, despite the fact that the solution seems clear?
I think that some of the perennial problems of this conflict derive from
its unique nature. This is a conflict unparalleled in human history. To
the best of my knowledge, there is no other example of a nation that
returned after a 2,000-year absence to a territory which for all that time
it had regarded as its homeland. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, less than one per cent of the Jewish people lived in the Land of
Israel. Now, the number of Jews living in Israel amounts to nearly half of
the Jewish people in the world. However, we must understand that this
historical event is also unique for the Palestinians and the whole Arab
world. The Jews themselves did not really anticipate that such a return to
their ancient homeland would be possible. The idea remained a religious,
half-messianic dream. And then, suddenly, this return took place, and the
Jews themselves are still amazed that it came to pass. It is therefore no
wonder that the Arabs too, and especially the Palestinians, are still
unable to comprehend, existentially or morally, what has befallen them.
There are conflicts between neighbouring states over territory, and there
are colonial conquests in which powers conquer territories to exploit
their resources. There are also conquests where people come to a foreign
territory to create a new identity by settling an unknown land.
But the return of the Jews to the Land of Israel does not resemble any of
these cases. Not only did the Jews not have a mother country, but in
Europe they lived as a foreign nation, and this alien status led to
expulsion and annihilation. The Jews did not come to exploit the resources
of Palestine or to subjugate its residents. Nor did the Jews come in order
to build a new identity and assimilate the local natives into it.
Zionism aimed to renew and deepen an old identity, to turn the partial
Jew, who lived a life that was not wholly his own, into a Jew responsible
for all elements of his surroundings. There was no intention to damage the
identity of the Arabs, or to merge it with the renewed Jewish identity.
The Jews came to their historic homeland and made it known to the
residents: your land is actually our land, the places where you live were
once ours, and we are adding the original place-names to the names of your
cities and towns. We have not come to exploit you, we have not come to
conquer you, we have not come to expel you, and we have not come to absorb
you, but rather we have merely come to replace your reality with a
completely different narrative.
It is therefore understandable that the Arabs were shocked and infuriated.
This is all the more the case since, for centuries, they had regarded the
Jews, as had much of the world, simply as people with a different
religion, but not a distinct nationality. And so, the Arabs tried to
interpret Zionism as ordinary colonialism, and thought that it would be
possible to fight it the way that other nations had — which explains the
enduring weakness of their struggle.
Thus the very legitimacy of the State of Israel’s right to exist remains
an open question to this very day. Never before has the question of
legitimacy been so fundamental to the conflict between nations. In many
cases, the question of Israel’s legitimacy is not even tied to any real
territorial, religious, or ideological conflict. Iran never had any
territorial or military conflict with Israel. In the early days of the
State of Israel’s existence, the two countries enjoyed good relations.
But for almost 30 years, Iran has been at the forefront of those who deny
the legitimacy of Israel, and indeed threatens to destroy it.
Even when the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem to initiate
a peace treaty with Israel, he did not base his visit upon the recognition
of Israel’s legitimacy, but rather on the fact of its existence. He
defined his peace initiative with a practical formulation: “Even if we
were capable of destroying Israel, the world would not let us do so. And
we have no chance of fighting against the whole world.”
Israel’s legitimacy was granted in the famous partition decision of the
United Nations on November 29, 1947. This decision was not taken only out
of a moral impulse to help the Jews rehabilitate themselves after the
Holocaust, but also as a result of the postwar fear and panic felt by the
Europeans, who saw that antisemitism was a threat to their own existence.
The pathological interaction between the non-Jew and the Jew can bring
disaster upon the murderer as well. When one reads the biographies of
Hitler and sees how insanely fixated he was in his Jew-hatred, leading to
the disastrous ruin of his own country, one understands that the
compulsion exhibited by the nations of Europe to help the Jews derived
also from a wish to help themselves. And now we see clearly that such
pathological interactions continue to reverberate in other parts of the
world, such as Iran, and endanger not only the Jews but those who hate
them as well.
True, the countries that supported the decision of the United Nations did
not ask the permission of the Arabs. This feeling of guilt on the
world’s part toward the Palestinians is fundamentally, in my view, a
moral and positive feeling, yet often it is not steered constructively
into the proper channels. Instead of providing serious help to the
Palestinians in establishing their own state, securing its existence and
economic success, and also preventing Israel from encroaching on
Palestinian territory, the generous humanitarian aid has led only to
chronic dependency rather than the development of durable sovereignty.
And yet, the original refusal to recognise the legitimacy of Israel has
undergone changes over the years, and there have been positive
developments. There is the recognition that Jewishness is not just a
religious identity but first and foremost a national identity. The Jews
began their historical journey as Am Yisrael, the Jewish people, which
preceded the Torah. The Jewish religion is not a necessary condition for
Jewish national identity, but only an important cultural component.
And although recognition of Israeli nationality is increasingly
widespread, this recognition is still obstructed by two dangerous notions
which threaten peace and reconciliation. The first is connected with the
rejection of the legitimacy of Zionism. And the second has to do with the
growing tendency among the Palestinians, in the Arab world, and no small
number of Europeans as well, to prefer a one-state solution.
The concept of Zionism has become the focus of the attacks on Israel.
Hamas spokesmen speak not of “Israelis” but of “Zionists”. Gilad
Shalit, the Israeli soldier they have been holding captive for nearly two
years, is referred to by Hamas as “the Zionist soldier”. Sheikh
Nasrallah, leader of Hizbollah, continues to speak of us not as Israelis
and not as Jews, but as “Zionists”. So too the President of Iran.
Discussion about the “de-Zionisation” of the State of Israel may also
be heard in intellectual circles and even among some Jewish leftists. In
Israel there are some people who call themselves post- or non-Zionist.
Since, after the Holocaust, there is great sensitivity about any talk of
harming the Jews, and antisemitism is considered a criminal offence,
opposition to Jews or Israel has sometimes been replaced with the
denunciation of Zionism.
The Zionist movement was established to found a Jewish state in the Land
of Israel, open to any Jew who wished to become a citizen. This is
Zionism, full-stop. Within the Jewish people there are differing
ideologies, different perceptions, and various notions of national mission
or goals. All the plans, the dreams, the intentions, and also the policies
adopted in the course of the state’s existence have nothing to do with
Zionism. They are similar to the challenges that face every nation in the
world. Zionism has to do only with establishing a Jewish state, and anyone
who supports the principle that this state should be open to any Jew who
wants to become a citizen, is a Zionist. Anyone who opposes this is not a
Zionist — and yet may still be a loyal citizen.
The sole practical expression of Zionism today is the Law of Return. It is
not a racist law; it is a moral law. For when the nations of the world
decided in favour of the founding of a Jewish state, they intended that
this would enable every Jew who wished to live in an independent Jewish
state to do so. And it may also be said that after a Palestinian state is
established, it will also have a Law of Return. The same way that this
would be a just law for the Palestinians, it is a proper law for the
Jewish state as well.
This is Zionism, full stop. And what is important to this definition is
that full stop at the end. Anyone who wants to criticise Israel should do
so on the same terms and with the same tools that he would criticise any
other country. This is why in many cases the fierce opposition to Zionism
may be interpreted as opposition to the very existence of the State of
Israel, and not to any particular policy of the Israeli government.
The second obstacle to peace is an idea calling for the establishment of a
bi-national Israel-Palestinian state. On paper, this may seem alluring,
but in reality it is a recipe for perpetuating the conflict indefinitely.
Because the land called both Israel and Palestine is the homeland of both
peoples, say the devotees of the bi-national state, and because these two
peoples are entwined with one another — given the existence of an Arab
minority that amounts to some twenty per cent of the population of Israel,
and given all the settlements scattered throughout the West Bank — it is
better to combine them than to separate them.
Embedded here is the dangerous illusion that it is indeed possible to
combine in peace and harmony, in the framework of a single state, two
peoples who are so different in their language, religion, culture, and
history, two peoples divided by a deep economic chasm, two peoples
connected to their own exterior worlds. These are two peoples who for the
last century have been intensely engaged in a bloody and intractable
conflict. In Europe, we see how people close to one another in religion,
culture, and history, are today splitting into different states — the
Czechs and the Slovaks, or the peoples of Yugoslavia or the former Soviet
Union. How can one imagine the Palestinians and Israelis setting up a
joint framework that would not rapidly turn into apartheid or a state of
incessant infighting, where half the parliament would be composed of
Israelis and the other half of Palestinians, and every issue would be
decided on the basis of national preference and not on its merits?
Both the Palestinians and the Israelis as two different nations deserve
their own states. There must be a clear border with crossing points. In
Israel, there is an Arab minority with full citizenship. It is very
possible that in the Palestinian state there would also be a small Jewish
minority, which would consist of those West Bank settlers who would be
willing to live under Palestinian control — provided that the
Palestinians would agree to grant them citizenship.
A separation wall between Israel and Palestine along the 1967 border would
be the proper border wall, and not the problematic wall that today extends
into Palestinian territory. This solution is the only way to achieve a
peaceful life in the Middle East.
During the early years of Zionism, the great Jewish scholar Gershom
Scholem said that the Jews were embarking on a difficult journey, a return
to history. In other words, the Jews, who constructed their diaspora
identity on the basis of mythological memory and time, were now returning
to the clear-cut elements of identity bound up with a territory defined by
borders, and a chronological understanding of their own history and that
of the nations around them. For this reason, the United States, whose
identity is built more upon myth than on a clear historical consciousness,
did not succeed, for all its good will, to understand the problems of the
Middle East, and therefore also did not succeed, despite all its efforts,
to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.
